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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
ROBERT ELLIS COX,

CaseNo.20040894-SC

Defendant/Petitioner.

This Court has asked Petitioner Robert Cox and the state to address whether an
appellate court has the authority to remand a case for nunc-pro-tunc resentencing when it
lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from the convictions. (See Order, dated December 22,
2004.) Cox maintains it does.
As set forth in the Brief of Petitioner, if an existing record supports that defense
counsel was ineffective in perfecting an appeal, an appellate court has the authority to
remand the case to the original sentencing court and to order, advise, direct, or instruct
resentencing, even where the appellate court otherwise lacks jurisdiction over an appeal
from the convictions. (Brief of Petitioner, dated March 25, 2005.) Cox asked the Court
of Appeals to remand for resentencing here. It refused. See State v. Cox, 2004 UT App
277, 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 305. He is now asking this Court for a remedy.
In its brief, the state acknowledges that this Court has inherent supervisory powers
and authority over the judiciary in this State. (See Brief of Respondent ("State's Brief),

dated July 1, 2005, at 17.) Likewise, while this Court may dismiss an appeal for lack of
jurisdiction over the convictions, it also may advise or explain (see id. at 11) further
proceedings for the parties and trial court to follow. (Id.)
The state agrees that resentencing in certain circumstances is an appropriate
remedy. (Id. at 35 (asserting that the state will stipulate to resentencing "when the record
facts indisputably demonstrate that the defendant was denied his right to appeal").)
However, it maintains that if an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over convictions, it
must dismiss; it may not remand the case to the original court for resentencing even
where the existing record supports it. (See State's Brief, Argument.) That is untenable.
An appellate court is charged with carefully protecting the right to appeal. State v.
Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). At this juncture, Cox has been denied an appeal
through no fault of his own. (Brief of Petitioner, Argument B.) He is seeking a remedy in
resentencing. (Id., Argument A.2.) While an appellate court may lack jurisdiction over
an appeal from the convictions, it also may direct resentencing in the original case so that
a defendant may take a timely appeal from the new sentence and judgment. See State v.
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37-38 (Utah 1981). That is what Cox requests here.
THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE RESENTENCING AS A REMEDY
WHEN COUNSEL IS INEFFECTIVE IN PERFECTING AN APPEAL; IT
MAINTAINS ONLY THAT AN APPELLATE COURT MAY NOT ORDER
THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING COURT TO PROVIDE SUCH A
REMEDY. YET, UTAH LAW PERMITS REMAND AND
RESENTENCING.
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A. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT COUNSEL IN THIS CASE WAS
INEFFECTIVE IN PERFECTING AN APPEAL FROM THE CONVICTIONS.
THUS. COX IS ENTITLED TO REMAND TO THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING
COURT.
Before this Court or the Court of Appeals may exercise statutory appellate
jurisdiction over a conviction, a timely notice of appeal must be filed. See Utah R. App.
P. 3 & 4 (2005); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3), 78-2a-3(2) (2002).
In this case, the record supports that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in perfecting an appeal from the convictions. (Brief of Petitioner, Argument B.) It
shows that after trial and before sentencing, counsel filed a post-trial motion for a new
trial. (See R. 182-86,203-06.) The motion was premature and untimely under Utah R.
Crim. P. 24(c) (2005) (motion must be made within ten days after sentencing). It did not
toll the effect of the sentence and judgment for purposes of the appeal. See State v.
Putnik, 2002 UT 122, T|5, 63 P.3d 91.
Nevertheless, at sentencing in December 2003, counsel for Cox claimed in open
court that the motion stayed the time for filing a notice of appeal. (R. 291:4-5; see also
302: 15-17.) Counsel's representations were incorrect. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (stating
that a timely post-trial motion will toll the time for an appeal); Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c)
(specifying that a new trial motion must be filed after sentencing). They misled Cox.
Also, counsel acknowledged an appeal for Cox in the case. (R. 291:4-5.)
However, counsel did not file a timely notice. Instead, almost three months after
sentencing, on March 2, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the post-trial motion. (R.
302.) During the hearing, trial counsel assisted Cox in signing a notice of appeal, and
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counsel advised Cox and the trial court that he would file the notice after the trial court
entered the order on the post-trial motion. (R. 302:15-17.) At that point in the
proceedings, the notice would have been too late. See Utah R. App. P. 3 & 4. Cox again
was misled by counsel's misstatements since the time for appeal had elapsed.
On March 11, 2004, the trial court entered an order denying the post-trial motion.
(R. 263-65.) Cox then filed his notice of appeal on April 8, 2004. (R. 266.) The notice
was filed within 30 days of the order on the post-trial motion. It did not give the Court of
Appeals jurisdiction over the convictions.
On August 19, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. Cox,
2004 UT App 277. It also rejected Cox's request to remand the case to the original sentencing court for the limited purpose of resentencing. According to the Court of Appeals,
Cox must pursue resentencing in habeas proceedings and he must demonstrate what the
record here already established: "that he lost his right to appeal because of counsel's misrepresentations or ineffective assistance.11 Id (relying on Utah R. Civ. P. 65C). The
Court of Appeals maintained it could not remand for resentencing because it lacked
jurisdiction over an appeal from the convictions. Cox, 2004 UT App 277. It did not see
the duplicity in its ruling: while it purportedly lackedjurisdiction to order anything
further, it simultaneously ordered Cox to pursue his remedy in habeas. Id
The state does not dispute that trial counsel was ineffective in perfecting a timely
appeal from the convictions in Cox's case. (See State's Brief.) That point is uncontested.
Notwithstanding, the state asserts that even under the circumstances here, an
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appellate court may not remand to the original sentencing court for resentencing. (See
e.g. State's Brief at 5.) According to the state, if an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over
a conviction, it must dismiss the appeal without more. (Id.) In connection with that position, the state has cited to cases that have no relevance to the resentencing issue here, and
it has rejected or disregarded orders from this Court supporting remand to the original
criminal case where the record supports ineffective assistance of counsel. The state also
seems to claim that the rules of appellate procedure prohibit remand for resentencing.
(See State's Brief at 6-10,14-15, 18-25.) Cox has addressed each matter below.
1. The State Has Cited to Cases That Do Not Concern Resentencing.
The state maintains that if an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from
the convictions, it must dismiss; it may not remand the case to the original sentencing
court for resentencing. In support of its position, the state has cited to civil cases. It also
has cited to State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122; State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, 57 P.3d 1065;
and State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264 (Utah 1997). (State's Brief at 7, 8-10, 14-15.) Those
cases support that an appellate court may not exercise statutory appellate jurisdiction over
the convictions in a case where the appeal was not properly perfected. Cox does not
dispute that proposition. He recognizes that at this stage in his case, the Court of Appeals
lacks jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3(2) over an appeal from the convictions; thus, he
did not ask the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction under that provision. Rather, he
asked the Court of Appeals to order a process pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(l) for a
remedy in the original sentencing court. He asked the court to remand for resentencing.
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The Court of Appeals had statutory authority to grant Cox's request. (See Brief of
Petitioner at 18-21 (discussing an appellate court's authority to dismiss an appeal for lack
of jurisdiction and to remand for further proceedings in the original court).)
Specifically, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l), the Court of Appeals has
the authority to order any process necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. See also Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(2) (providing this Court with the same statutory authority). That power
and authority is not limited to cases where a proper appeal has been perfected. See
Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679, 681 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Indeed, the authority to
order any "process" in aid of jurisdiction is separate from an appellate court's statutory
jurisdiction over an appeal. Id. (stating that the authority to order any process in aid of
jurisdiction does not depend on appellate jurisdiction over the matter); see also Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(2) (concerning authority to issue any process in aid of jurisdiction)
and -2(3) (concerning statutory appellate jurisdiction); 78-2a-3(l) and (2). Thus, where
Cox requested relief in the Court of Appeals in aid of jurisdiction, and where the record
supported that Cox received ineffective assistance of counsel in perfecting an original
appeal in his case, the Court of Appeals had the authority to direct or remand the case to
the original sentencing court for resentencing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l).
The cases cited by the state in this matter are not relevant to that issue. Putnik,
2002 UT 122, Bowers, 2002 UT 100, and Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, do not address the issue
of remand for resentencing when the record supports ineffective assistance of counsel in
perfecting an appeal. There is no indication in those cases that the defendant requested or
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briefed the issue of resentencing, and there is no indication that the Court contemplated
the issue under Utah law. See Putmk, 2002 UT 122; Bowers, 2002 UT 100; Jiminez, 938
P.2d 264. Since Putnik, Bowers, and Jiminez do not discuss remand for resentencing,
they are not controlling authority for the issue here. See Horton v. Goldminer's
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 1989) (ruling that where case law fails to provide
analysis for a proposition, it has little persuasive effect and is not dispositive of Ihe issue).
2. Utah Cases Support Remand Where Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Is
Established on the Existing Record.
Next, the state maintains that no precedent from this Court supports "defendant's
contention that an appellate court may, in an untimely appeal, remand to the district court
with instructions to resentence the defendant." (State's Brief at 16.) Yet, orders from this
Court support remand. Cox provided copies of the orders as a courtesy. See Slate v.
Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC (Addendum D to the Brief of Petitioner); State v.
Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC (Addendum E to the Brief of Petitioner); State v.
Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC (Addendum F to the Brief of Petitioner). He also
presented the orders to the Court of Appeals. (See State's Brief, Addendum C at 2, ml.)
In State v. Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC, State v. Munford, Case No. 20010413SC, and State v. Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC, this Court specifically granted Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association's request to remand for resentencing. The state was
involved in those proceedings. See Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, Case No.
20010413-SC; Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC.
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In each of those cases, the defendant desired to appeal from the convictions; this
Court lacked jurisdiction over an appeal; this Court remanded for resentencing. See
Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC; Hassan, Case No.
20020885-SC. In Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC, this Court ordered that counsel must
be appointed to protect the defendant's right to appeal (Addendum E to Brief of
Petitioner). In Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC, this Court recognized that defendant was
denied his right to appeal by an attorney "who has since been suspended from the practice
of law." (Addendum D to Brief of Petitioner.) In Hassan, Case No. 20020885, this Court
relied on its statutory authority under § 78-2-2(2) to issue "any process necessary" in aid
of jurisdiction and to carry its orders into effect. (Addendum F to Brief of Petitioner.)
The orders in Clark, Munford, and Hassan constitute in-court precedent; the
principles set forth therein apply to this case.
The record here supports that while Cox intended to exercise his constitutional
right to appeal, trial counsel failed to properly perfect that appeal. (Brief of Appellant at
31-37.) Thus, the Court of Appeals lacked statutory appellate jurisdiction over the
convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2). However, the Court of Appeals had the
power and authority to remand at this juncture for resentencing (see Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(l)), just as this Court did in Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC, Munford, Case No.
20010413-SC, and Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC. The orders in those cases have force
and effect; they are relevant to the issue here. They support remand for resentencing.
Cox is entitled to remand to the original sentencing court for additional reasons
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that the state has not addressed in its brief. (See State's Brief.) First, the trial court here
failed to advise Cox at sentencing of his right to appeal. {See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c); (R.
291; 203-06). That supports remand for new sentencing proceedings. See U.S. v. Butler,
938 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1991) (remanding for resentencing where the trial court failed to
properly advise defendant of his right to appeal); (Brief of Petitioner at 35).
Second, Cox has established ineffective assistance of counsel on the existing record. (Brief of Petitioner at 31-35.) Under Utah law, if the record supports ineffective
assistance, the appellate court will remand the case to that point in the original criminal
proceedings where the ineffective assistance occurred. See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT
32, p 7 , 984 P.2d 376 (ruling that counsel's deficient performance at trial entitled
defendant to a new trial); State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996) (finding ineffective
assistance and remanding for new proceedings); State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027,
1029-30 (Utah 1991) (finding ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to
prosecutorial misconduct at trial, and remanding for a new trial); State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182, 187-89 (Utah 1990) (remanding for a new trial where counsel failed to
investigate witnesses who were known to him before trial).
Since ineffective assistance is established on an existing record here, the case
should be remanded for new proceedings. Such an order of remand would not result in
preferential treatment to Cox, but would be consistent with other cases, where ineffective
assistance of counsel occurred. See e.g. Maestas, 1999 UT 32 at TJ37; Templin, 805 P.2d
at 187-89; (Brief of Petitioner at 34-35).
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In the context of this case, where the post-trial motion was untimely, it did not toll
the effect of the judgment for purposes of the appeal (see Utah R. App. P. 4; Utah R.
Crim. P. 24). The Court of Appeals lacked statutory appellate jurisdiction over the
judgment of convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (identifying appellate
jurisdiction). However, that did not preclude the Court of Appeals from saying more
about the matter. Specifically, where a notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of an
order on the post-trial motion, the court could remand to those proceedings. Pursuant to
the Court of Appeals1 statutory authority to order any process in aid of its jurisdiction
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)), and based on the record of ineffective assistance in the
proceedings here, the Court of Appeals should have ordered a limited remedy: remand to
that point in the proceedings where the error occurred. (Brief of Petitioner at 34-35.)
3. Remand Is Not Prohibited by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Finally, the state seems to claim that if an appellate court remands for resentencing, it somehow will be invoking or exercising its statutory appellate jurisdiction over
the convictions, or enlarging the time for appeal under the appellate rules, or suspending
or circumventing those rules. (See State's Brief at 6-7, 18-21.)
Yet, that is not the case. Remand does not require an appellate court to enlarge the
time for an appeal under the rules. See Black's Law Dictionary, 571 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining an enlargement of time to mean an "extension of the time allowed to perform an
action"); Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37-38 (stating the time for appeal cannot be enlarged; and
articulating a motion procedure in the sentencing court for resentencing).
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It does not require an appellate court to suspend, circumvent or transubstantiate
the appellate rules. See Black's Law Dictionary, 260, 1487 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "circumvention" to mean the act of bypassing or avoiding; and defining "suspend" to mean to
interrupt, postpone, or defer); Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (explaining that certain motions will suspend the effect of an existing
judgment); Webster's New World College Dictionary, 1522 (4th ed. 1999) (defining
"transubstantiate" to mean to transform).
Remand will return this case to that point in the proceedings in the original trial
court where error occurred. It will serve to purge the proceedings of the taint caused by
the error. Just as remandfor a new trial does not serve to enlarge, suspend or circumvent
the appellate rules, remand for resentencing does not have any such effect on the rules.
Remand is not prohibited by the rules of appellate procedure.
B. RESENTENCING IS A REMEDY THAT IS AVAILABLE IF THE RECORD
SUPPORTS THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN PERFECTING AN
APPEAL.
1. The Court of Appeals Had Authority to Order Resentencing.
In this case, the Court of Appeals refused to direct or order resentencing in the original sentencing court even though the record supported ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Cox, 2004 UT App 277. It seemed to believe that only a habeas court could order
resentencing. Id. It ruled that Cox must seek his remedy in habeas in the district court,
and he must establish what the existing record already supported here: "that he lost his
right to appeal because of counsel's misrepresentations or ineffective assistance." Id.
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Yet an appellate court may order the remedy of resentencing. Resentencing allows
a defendant to be sentenced "upon the previous finding of guilt so as to afford him fan
opportunity of prosecuting and perfecting an appeal, since the time for taking such appeal
would date from the rendition of the new judgment.,,f Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (cite
omitted).
Cox maintains that if the existing record supports ineffective assistance of counsel
in perfecting the appeal, an appellate court may order or direct resentencing in the
original trial court (see Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC;
Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC), or it may advise a motion practice for the procedure in
that court.
In State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), this Court advised trial courts in
how to proceed with resentencing in the original criminal case. It looked to the commonlaw writ of coram nobis and Rule 65B(i) to adopt a motion practice in the sentencing
court. See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i) (1977)). It did not
require the defendant to pursue resentencing in habeas proceedings. See Utah R. Civ. P.
65B(f) (1977) (concerning habeas corpus proceedings); (Brief of Petitioner at 14-16).
Rule 65B as it exists today specifically accommodates a "motion" in the original
sentencing court for resentencing. It allows a party to file a petition for relief; it states,
"there shall be no special form of writ." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) (2005). Thus, a petition
under Rule 65B may be in the form of a motion in the original sentencing court. (See
Brief of Petitioner at 16, n.3.)
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Also, Rule 65B applies where "no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy is
available." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). If a defendant were denied an appeal through no
fault of his own, he has no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy for the appeal. Thus,
an appellate court may order resentencing in the original sentencing court so that defendant may file a motion under Rule 65B for the remedy. (Brief of Petitioner at 23-26.)
In the alternative, Rule 60(b) may be an appropriate avenue for resentencing in the
original sentencing court. Pursuant to that rule, a party may be relieved from a final judgment for any reason justifying relief and upon such terms as are just where there has been
inadvertence, excusable neglect, or the like. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The rule accommodates relief from judgment where defense counsel was ineffective, and it accommodates
reimposition of the original sentence to ensure justice. (See Brief of Petitioner at 29-31.)
Under the proper circumstances, an appellate court may direct a defendant to file a
motion under Rule 60(b) in the original sentencing court for resentencing. (Id.)
In this case, Cox has raised several provisions that would accommodate a procedure for resentencing in the original court. (See Brief of Petitioner, Argument A.2.) Cox
relied on those same provisions when he asked the Court of Appeals to order resentencing. (See "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Temporarily Remand this Case to
the Trial Court for Resentencing," attached as Addendum C to the State's Brief, and
citing Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC (remanding for direct resentencing); Munford, Case
No. 20010413-SC (same); Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC (same); Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(l) (authorizing the Court of Appeals to issue any process necessary in aid of its
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jurisdiction); Barnard, 882 P.2d at 681 (recognizing that the court of appeals may
exercise its statutory powers even where an appeal has not been perfected); Johnson, 635
P.2d at 37-38 (advising that defendant should file a motion in the original sentencing
court for resentencing to revive the right to appeal); Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) & 65B.)
The Court of Appeals rejected Cox's request and refused to order resentencing in
the sentencing court. Cox, 2004 UT App 277. That was error. (Brief of Petitioner,
Argument A.) Cox now is seeking a remedy here.
2. This Court May Order Resentencing in the Original Criminal Case and It May
Implement Resentencing Procedures for the Trial Court to Follow.
As set forth in the Brief of Petitioner, pursuant to the Utah Constitution and case
law, this Court has inherent supervisory authority over the judiciary in this State. (See
Brief of Petitioner, Argument A.2. (citing to cases supporting this Court's inherent supervisory powers over the judiciary in this State, and Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3)); see also
State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ^[37, 116 P.3d 305 (exercising inherent supervisory powers
to promulgate a reasonable-doubt instruction for use in the trial courts of this State).
That authority is unique to this Court. (See State's Brief at 16 (complaining that
Cox did not rely on this Supreme Court's inherent supervisory powers in requesting relief
in the Court of Appeals, and also recognizing that the Court of Appeals does not share in
this Court's powers over the judiciary); also State's Brief at 32 (complaining that Cox did
not rely on this Supreme Court's constitutional powers in requesting relief in the Court of
Appeals); but see Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3 concerning the "Jurisdiction of [this] Supreme
Court".) This Court may issue all processes and forms of proceedings necessary for the
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exercise of its jurisdiction, in aid of its jurisdiction, to a complete determination of any
cause, and to ensure a just process and result. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3; see also
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(2), 78-7-5(9) (2002); (Brief of Petitioner, Argument A.2.).
While the Court of Appeals had sufficient authority under Utah statutory law and
case law to order the relief that Cox requested here for resentencing (see e.g. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(l) (authorizing the Court of Appeals to issue any process necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction); Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37-38 (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction and
advising that defendant should file a motion in the original sentencing court for
resentencing to revive the right to appeal)), this Court now may affirm a procedure
pursuant to its inherent supervisory powers for the trial court to follow that will allow
resentencing in the original case, where the existing record supports ineffective assistance
of counsel in perfecting the appeal. (See Brief of Petitioner, Argument A.2.)
Resentencing is a proper remedy. The state does not dispute that proposition. (See
State's Brief at 35 (recognizing that a defendant may be entitled to resentencing when the
record facts indisputably demonstrate that he was denied his right to appeal).)
Cox should be resentenced in the sentencing court "so as to afford him 'an
opportunity of prosecuting and perfecting an appeal, since the time for taking such appeal
would date from the rendition of the new judgment.'" Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (cite
omitted). He respectfully requests that this Court order the remedy here for resentencing
in the original criminal case.
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C. PROCEEDINGS UNDER RULE 65C AND THE POST-CONVICTION
REMEDIES ACT WOULD BE BURDENSOME TO COX.
Where the Court of Appeals ordered Cox to comply with the provisions of Rule
65C and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (the "Act") for relief in this case, Cox, 2004
UT App 277, that is unnecessary. Cox has already demonstrated ineffective assistance of
counsel on the existing record. (Brief of Petitioner, Argument B.) He is entitled to a
remedy. He should not be required to proceed with habeas for resentencing here.
The state seems to agree. In its brief, the state asserts that defendant may file a
"simple petition" for resentencing in the district court, where he will be represented by
"able counsel." (State's Brief at 34-35.) The state claims that a simple petition is
efficient and it will take less time to prepare than a brief for appeal. (Id.)
As set forth in the Brief of Petitioner, Rule 65C and the Act do not accommodate a
simple petition for resentencing or the right to "able counsel." (Brief of Petitioner,
Argument C.) Indeed, according to Rule 65C, before a petitioner may be entitled to
relief, he must file in forma pauperis papers, a petition for relief, and supporting
memoranda. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b)-(d). The petition must set forth "all claims that
the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence." Utah R. Civ.
P. 65C(c). Any "[additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence
may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown." Jd. Also,
successive petitions may not be permitted. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(d).
In the context of this case, if Cox were required to proceed under Rule 65C for resentencing, he must raise all claims in his petition that he intends to pursue later in
16

habeas. He will be required to present all substantive claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, trial error, and the discovery of new evidence (see Utah Code Ann. §
78-3 5 a-104), together with his procedural request for resentencing. He must including
supporting attachments and a legal memorandum on the matter. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(d),
(e). Where Cox must present all substantive claims together with his request for
resentencing, his petition will be more involved than an actual brief on appeal.
Thereafter, once Cox has filed his papers for habeas and resentencing under Rule
65C, the habeas court will review them. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g). If that courtfindsprocedural or filing defects, it may delay the proceedings or dismiss the claims. Id. If the
habeas court does not dismiss any or all claims, Cox may request the appointment of pro
bono counsel in the matter. See Cox, 2004 UT App 277; Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a109(1). The habeas court has the discretion to grant or deny that request; appellate counsel here may be precluded from representing Cox in the habeas proceedings. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(l).
The habeas court then will forward Cox's petition to the Attorney General's office
for a response and further proceedings. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h)-(m).
In this case, the state claims it routinely stipulates to "the grant of a postconviction petition and resentencing" when the record facts support it. (State's Brief at
35.) However, the state may decide to contest other claims raised in the petition, thereby
resulting in further delay. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(i) - (j).
After the state has filed its papers in habeas, the district court may grant the
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procedural remedy and order immediate resentencing in the original criminal case. See
State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993). At that point in the proceedings, it is
not clear what will become of the substantive claims that Cox has raised in his habeas
petition. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 through -110 (2002).
They may be dismissed. If Cox's substantive claims then are not raised or resolved on the
merits in the direct appeal, he may wish to proceed with them later in habeas. However,
if they have been dismissed for resentencing, he likely will have to litigate whether the
substantive claims can be revived.
If Cox is required to pursue resentencing in habeas, it is not a simple task. He
must take measures at this stage - unrelated to resentencing - to ensure that he has not
waived any substantive claim that he may intend to raise at an appropriate time after an
appeal in future habeas proceedings. The process at this juncture is cumbersome, time
consuming and unpredictable.1
Since a person seeking habeas relief typically has had his direct appeal, Rule 65C
and the Act do not accommodate a simple procedure for resentencing. Those provisions
1

In Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, this Court dismissed the defendant's appeal as untimely
and directed him to proceed with habeas relief under Rule 65C and the Act. Id. That was
in 1997. To date, no direct appeal has been processed for Jiminez. In Putnik, 2002 UT
122, and Bowers, 2002 UT 100, this Court simply dismissed the appeals. No direct
appeal has been processed for those defendants.
In Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC; and Hassan,
Case No. 20020885-SC, this Court ordered remand for resentencing. The defendants in
those cases have since had an appeal on the merits as contemplated by this Court in
Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38, and Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 704 (stating that the right to appeal must
be carefully protected). See State v. Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 108 P.3d 695; State v. Clark,
2004 UT 25, 89 P.3d 162; State v. Munford, 2003 UT App 279, 2003 UT App. LEXIS
255 (attached hereto as an Addendum).
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must demonstrate plain error. See State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, P 13, 10 P.3d 346.
The requirements for plain error are that (1)
error exists, (2) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is
harmful. See id.
Munford argues on appeal that the State
proved only his presence at the homicide, not
participation. We disagree. The evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, demonstrates acts on Munford's part
that could be construed as knowledge and
participation, particularly in light of Kiriluk's
roommate's testimony that Munford was
present on at least one occasion where
Kiriluk indicated he was going to kill Brown.
The cumulative evidence was certainly not so
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have
entertained [*3] doubt.

Munford also argues that his trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to move for a
directed verdict. However, because we
determine that the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury verdict, it stands to reason
that a motion for a directed verdict would
have been unsuccessful and futile. "The
decision to forgo futile acts does not amount
to ineffective assistance/' State v. Wallace,
2002 UTApp 295, P 27, 55 P.3d 1147.
The conviction is affirmed.
Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

